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This paper examines  the  effects  of the use  of increasingly-popular  phytosanitary regulations
on  production costs,  and output and factor trade  flows.  The case addressed  is  that of the
European  regulation  of maximum chemical  residues in cigarettes  manufactured  with tobacco
containing  maleic  hydrazide.  The paper presents  simulations of the  effects  of tightening  the
EU  regulation  on the  tobacco  growing and manufacturing  industries.  The analysis  focusses  on
input/output market linkages  and on the  substitution  away from the residue-contaminated  U.S.
input to residue-free  non-U.S. inputs.  This  induced  substitution  results in higher costs,  lower
quantity  supplied of the final product,  and higher prices  for U.S.  cigarettes  in Europe.
Cross-price effects  lead to higher quantities  of EU cigarettes  sold  and a corresponding
increase  in the use of all inputs,  including  U.S.  tobacco.  When  the U.S.  tobacco price  is
allowed  to fall,  direct  price effects  stimulate  the EU  derived demand  for U.S.  tobacco.
Although  the regulation  is protectionist  in the output  market,  it leads to  increased EU imports
of the  residue-contaminated  input. When  the price  of U.S.  tobacco  adjusts,  the regulation  is
actually  antiprotective  for EU growers.  The regulation  also  indirectly  influences  production
practices  of U.S.  tobacco  growers  and leads  to lower  levels  of MH residues  on  U.S.  leaf.
The  importance  of  understanding  the  effects  on  vironment, though  they would also influence trade
trade  flows due  to sanitary  and phytosanitary  reg-  flows.
ulations has grown in recent years as the number of  As a case  in point,  some members  of the Euro-
these  non-tariff barriers  have  increased  while  the  pean Union (Germany,  Italy,  and Spain) presently
number  and  level  of  tariffs  have  declined.  The  restrict  to 80 parts per million the  level of maleic
translation  of  environmental  and  product  safety  hydrazide (MH) in domestic  and foreign cigarettes
concerns  into regulation has occurred  for two cen-  (Yelverton).  This  affects  almost exclusively  U.S.
tral  reasons (Kinsey and  Houck):  in part there has  tobacco,  which  taken alone  exceeds  this limit  on
been  an increasing  demand for environmental  and  average  (Sheets  et  al.).  MH  is  a  systemic  cell-
health  protection  associated  with  rising  incomes;  division  inhibitor  that  raises  tobacco  leaf quality
and  scientific  advances  have  improved the  ability  through  the  control  of  nutrient  depletion  due  to
to detect  threats  to  safety  (Sheldon  and von  Wit-  lateral branching.  Mechanization  of U.S.  produc-
zke).  Yet the suppression of trade protectionism is  tion  has  made  substitutes  to  MH,  such  as  hand
also a widely held objective and there is an increas-  removal  and  use of fatty  alcohols,  relatively  less
ing anxiety over trade effects as provisions  for en-  profitable.  Future  harmonization  or  expanded
vironmental  issues  and  food  safety  have  been  adoption  of  EU  phytosanitary  regulations,  which
added  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  would amplify  the trade effect  of MH restrictions,
Trade (GATT) and the North American Free Trade  appear to be legal under GATT (e.g.,  GATT  Sec-
Agreement  (NAFTA) (e.g.,  USDA,  1994).  These  retariat)  and  generally  in  the spirit of other inter-
provisions  allow for the establishment  of rules  os-  national  agreements,  such  as  NAFTA  (Forsythe
tensibly designed  to protect consumers and the en-  and Lynch).  MH restrictions  do not explicitly  dis-
criminate  between  domestic  and  foreign  produc-
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duction  methods,  no limit on MH  residues is  nec-  trade flows.  The paper  stresses two  contributions:
essary (USDA,  1979).  to  the  analysis  of  trade  effects  of  phytosanitary
Maleic  hydrazide  restrictions  make  a  particu-  rules regarding chemical residues  generally, and to
larly interesting  case in the  study of the influence  the understanding  of the tobacco case in particular.
of phytosanitary  regulations  on  agricultural  trade  The analysis  focusses on input/output  market link-
flows: the chemical  is associated only with an im-  ages and on the substitution away from the residue-
ported  input  that  has  close  domestic  and  foreign  contaminated U.S.  input to residue-free  non-U.S.
substitutes,  but  the regulation  and  monitoring  are  inputs.  This  induced  substitution results  in higher
applied  to an imported  and domestically-produced  costs, lower quantity supplied of the final product,
output;  and both  inputs  and  outputs  are  traded.'  anrettes  in Europe.
Furthermore,  most U.S.  tobacco  is grown under  a  An important  point  to emphasize  is  that  cross-
government-sponsored  cartel raising prices by lim-  price  effects lead to higher quantities  of EU  ciga-
iting  output.  This issue can be cast in the broader  rettes  sold and  a corresponding  increase in the use
context  of  minimum quality  standards  in  interna-  of all inputs,  including  U.S.  tobacco.  In addition,
tional  trade.  Although  the  standards  are  nontariff  when  the U.S.  tobacco price is  allowed  to fall di-
trade barriers  their welfare  effects  can be ambigu-  rect price effects  stimulate the EU derived demand
ous  because  terms-of-trade  effects  can  increase  for  U.S.  tobacco.  These  results  imply  that,  al-
welfare  (Chambers  and Pick).  Hence empirical in-  though  the regulation is protectionist in the  output
vestigation of the impact of the standards is impor-  market,  it  leads  to  increased  EU  imports  of  the
tant to determine losers  and gainers.  One  addition  input  which  is  the  cause  of the  regulation  in  the
to the literature  made here  is elucidation  of a  spe-  first  place.  Furthermore,  when  the price  of U.S.
cific case of quality standards:  the EU regulation of  tobacco  adjusts,  the regulation  is  actually  antipro-
maleic hydrazide residue on tobacco products.  The  tective  for EU  growers.  The regulation  also idi-
analysis  also fills  in a gap  in the literature  by  ad-  rectly  influences  production  practices  of U.S.  to-
dressing the effect of an output standard on derived  bacco  growers  and  leads  to  lower  levels  of  MH
demand.  residues  on U.S.  leaf.
The MH  case  provides  an  example  of the  im-  The paper is organized  as follows: The first sec-
portance  of  taking  into  account  the  interdepen-  tion outlines  the general  effects  of a residue  regu-
dence  between  agriculture  production  and  manu-  lation when the regulation is associated with a par-
facturing.  In  1991,  U.S.  tobacco shipments to Eu-  ticular input having close substitutes.  These effects
rope were over 26 percent of domestic production,  can be separated into  the effects on manufacturers
over 40 percent of its total exports, comprising  105  of the final product and the effects on the suppliers
and  64  million  pounds  of  flue-cured  and  burley  of the  input  in question.  The second  section pre-
leaf. Almost 28 percent  (49,617 million pieces)  of  sents  a model of tobacco  trade and cigarette  man-
U.S.  cigarette exports went to the EU representing  ufacture,  and  discusses  its practical  implementa-
26  million  pounds  of  flue-cured  and  22  million  tion by use of a displacement  model of proportion-
pounds  of  burley  (Creek,  Capehart,  and  Grise).  ate changes  in endogenous  variables  due to  shifts
This implies that 77 percent of U.S.  tobacco going  in exogenous variables.  The third section gives the
to Europe is imported as unmanufactured  leaf and  results  of simulations  and  discusses their implica-
23  percent  arrives  in  the  form  of  cigarettes.  At  tions.  The  paper ends  with a concluding  section.
least  two  derived  demands-for  the  residue-
contaminated  and  residue-free  inputs-and  two
supply curves-the  domestically  and  foreign pro-  Modeling  Residue  Regulations
duced  outputs-would  be  affected  by  regulation.
Moreover,  at current usage rates an EU-wide adop-
tion  of  the  80  ppm  standard  would  not  directly  Before turning to the analysis of the influence of a
affect  the  demand  for  U.S.  unmanufactured  to-  residue  restriction,  a  brief discussion  of  tobacco
bacco  imports. It would,  however, affect  cigarette  manufacture is warranted.  Cigarette production in-
imports because of compliance costs faced by U.S.  volves the blending of flue-cured,  burley,  and ori-
manufacturers,  who  use  a  greater  proportion  of  ental tobacco  types,  establishing  flavor character-
U.S.  leaf;  and thus it would indirectly increase EU  istics.  Within each major type there is also a range
aggregate tobacco  leaf demand,  of quality  correlated  with production  region.  De-
This paper presents simulations of the effects  of  sired blend characteristics  can be achieved both by
tightening the EU regulation  on the tobacco grow-  mixing  types  and  by  mixing  qualities  of a  given
ing  and  manufacturing  industries  by  analyzing  its  type. Manufacturers  differentiate blends by mixing
influence on production costs,  factor demands,  and  leaf from different  areas of the  world. Beyond  to-Overton, Beghin,  and Foster  Regulations and Trade for Tobacco and Cigarettes  223
bacco exports,  cigarettes  as a final product are also  Price
widely  exported  and  compete  in  multi-product
markets  based on their price and flavoring charac-
teristics.  P° 
U.S.  manufacturers  rely mainly  on high quality  \  \Do
U.S.-grown  flue-cured  and burley  for blends,  al-  P'
though  recently  there has  been  increased  reliance  \D'
on  foreign-grown  substitutes  for U.S.  leaf (Sum-
mer and Alston).  A notable import, without a close  MC'(a')
U.S.-grown substitute is oriental tobacco.  Oriental  MC ° ______  ___MC
0(_)
tobacco  from Greece,  made  up 9.6%  of U.S.  cig-  MC 
arette tobacco  imports  in  1990  (see  Creek,  Cape-
hart,  and Grise Table  183).  EU flue-cured  and bur-
ley  on the other hand are  not major U.S.  imports.
By  contrast  EU  cigarette  manufacturers  import  Q  Q ° Quantity
large  amounts  of U.S.  tobacco.  Recently  subsidy  Figure 2.  U.S.  Flue-cured  Tobacco  Market
reforms  and relative price changes  traceable  to de-
mand shifts  have altered  EU-grown tobacco  qual-
ity  (Ferrara),  possibly  affecting  future  U.S.  to-  by the amount of the chemical relative to the use of
bacco demand.  both inputs,  i.e.,  ('yTI)/(T} + T2).  The ray passing
The introduction  of a residue regulation  associ-  through point A  is the initial expansion  path with-
ated  with  a  particular  input  gives  incentives  to  out regulation.  The ray passing  through point B is
manufacturers  to substitute away from inputs with  the expansion path resulting  from compliance  with
high residue levels  to those  with lower or no res-  a regulation  of no  more than R ppm.  Compliance
idues.  This  substitution  moves  manufacturers  leads  to  a  unit  cost  increase  from  CO to  Cl  and
away from the cost minimizing choice of inputs in  clearly  this  increase  depends  upon  the  substitut-
the  absence  of  the  regulation,  and  unit  costs  in-  ability of the inputs.  With perfect substitutes,  com-
crease  under compliance.  pliance  is  merely  a  move  along  a linear isoquant
This result can be seen by examining  in Figure 1  implying no cost increases.  With fixed proportions
the  unit isoquant of constant  returns  to  scale pro-  the regulation could not be met, costs of continued
duction using two essential  inputs, Ti and T2,  in a  production would be infinite,  and the manufacturer
blending process.  The horizontal  axis measures the  would retire from  the regulated  market.
amount of use of the residue-contaminated  input,  For cigarette manufacturers  producing a tobacco
Tl,  which has a fixed residue level of  y ppm (this  blend, either of these  extremes  is unlikely.  Manu-
is generalized to endogenous residues  below),  and  facturers  place  a  premium  on  maintaining  blend
the vertical axis measures  a residue-free input,  T2.  characteristics  (Beghin and Chang) suggesting im-
The total residue level  in the final product is given  perfect  input  substitutability.  Beghin  and  Chang,
and  Sumner and Alston  have shown that tobaccos
are  not combined  in fixed proportions.  The closer
Figure  1:  Unit lsoquant for the Tobacco Blend an  industry is  to fixed proportions  the more  costly
T2  is  regulation  compliance  and the  more  likely reg-
ulation is to affect the price and quantity demanded
of the final  product.
The effect on  U.S.  tobacco growers  is compli-
T2/T1  =  f(-R)/R  cated by  an  output-limiting,  price-enhancing  gov-
eminment-sponsored  cartel.  Figure  2  describes  the
c  /  possible  effects  of a binding  residue regulation on
C  T2/TI  the market  for U.S.  grown tobacco.  Total demand
is initially represented by the demand curve Do and
/B^  ^^  supply by the  marginal cost curve MC°('y °) condi-
tioned on residue level  y°.  The quota level  is set at
/ /  r^^ ~-  Unit isoquant  Q° such that marginal cost is MC° and the market-
clearing  price  is  P°.  The  quota  lease  rate  (L)  is
equal  to  the  difference  between  the  market  price
T1  and  the  marginal  cost  of  production  for  the
Figure 1.  Unit Isoquant for the Tobacco Blend  givenoutput level  (i.e. L° = P  - MC°).224  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1.  Equations of the Model  Table  2.  Endogenous  Variables
Supply  and  Demand for  Qi  = S  p  i  p i  p  R)  T*  U.S.  tobacco  used by EU  and U.S.  manufacturers  in
each cigarette:*  c  c,  P 2, PK, R)  cigarettes  for sale  in Europe
= D'(Pc,  PIc, Po, Y)  TlT  Total  amount of U.S.  tobacco  used in cigarettes  for
U.S.  tobacco  market  TiE  + TlU  +  Tli  =  QrT  sale  in Europe
equilibrium  condition  Tl
° Total  amount of U.S.  tobacco  demanded by others
The regulatory  y(Tl
i)  than those  selling  cigarettes  in Europe
restriction:  R  : (Ti + T2i)  P#1 The price  of U.S.  tobacco for EU  and U.S.
Derived  demands for  Xi  ppi  i  i  i  p  R  . manufacturers  (fixed  quota case)
factors of  , PTI,  72  'R)  T2'  non-U.S.  tobacco used by EU and U.S.  manufacturers
production:**  in cigarettes  for sale in Europe
The quota lease  rate:  -pL  = PT  -MC(QTI,  A)Z'  The quantity  of the tobacco  blend used by EU  and
U.S.  manufacturers
The level of MH  y = F(Qn 1, L)  Pz  The per unit value  of the EU  and U.S.  tobacco blends
residues:  Q'  The quantity  of EU and U.S.  produced cigarettes  for
sale  in Europe
*where i  =  E, for Europe,  and  U,  for the United  States.  The price  of EU and U.S.  cigarettes  in Europe
**where  J  is U.S.  tobacco  Tl,  other  tobaccos  T2,  and other  PI  The MH residue  level  on  U.S.,  tobacco
non-tobacco  inputs K.  L  The quota  lease rate  in the  U.S.
*where  i  = E, U
An  EU  residue regulation  shifts  the  demand  to
curve D1 .Two cases are considered: one maintains
the program price constant;  and the other maintains  the  price of the competing  cigarette, Pc, prices of
a  constant  quota  level.  To  maintain  the  initial  other  goods  Po,  and  consumers'  disposable  in-
price,  production limits  are reduced  to Ql.  Grow-  come,  Y.
ers adjust their production practices  in response  to  The total  amount  of U.S.  tobacco for the man-
the  new  output level,  resulting  in  a new  residue  ufacture  of cigarettes  consumed  in Europe  equals
level  of  yl  and  a  new  marginal  cost  curve,  the  demand  of EU  and  U.S.  manufacturers  (i.e.
MC(,yl).  An  altered  marginal  cost of production  TIE  +  TlU).  In  equilibrium,  the  total  U.S.  to-
MC'  determines  a new quota  lease rate,  Lt  = P° bacco  supply,  which equals  the  established  quota
- MC'. Figure 2 also  shows the effects  of allow-  level  (QT1),  is the  sum of that consumed  for  EU-
ing the price  to  adjust to  the  new  demand  condi-  destined  cigarettes  and  the amount  demanded  by
tions while quota levels remain constant. The mar-  other  users  of U.S.  tobacco  (Tl°).  Endogenous
ket price  must fall  to P'. Because  quota levels do  and exogenous  variables described above are listed
not  change,  there  is  no  shift  in  marginal  costs,  and  defined  in Tables  2  and 3.  In the  simulations
although  the lease  rate  decreases  to L2 =  PI  - which follow, we consider two cases of adjustment
MC°. of the U.S.  tobacco  program.  In the first case, the
To  generalize  this  discussion,  consider the  fol-  price  of U.S.  tobacco  is held  constant  by  adjust-
lowing  algebraic  model,  summarized  in Table  1,  ments  to the  quota levels.  In the second  case,  the
which  allows  a parametric  approximation of inter-  quota  is held  fixed  and the  price of U.S.  tobacco
national  tobacco  and  cigarette  markets.  Let  vari-  adjusts.  These two cases represent two polar cases
able T1 represent U.S. tobacco and the variable T2  of  possible  policy  response  to  decreases  in  de-
represent  other residue-free  tobaccos  used by both  mand.  Any  intermediate  policy  that  adjusts  both
EU  and  U.S.  cigarette  manufacturers  producing  quota and price would be bounded by the two cases
outputs  QC (where  i =  E, U representing  Europe  described.
and the United States).  The EU and U.S.  cigarette
supplies,  SC,  depend  on  their  own-price,  PC the
price  of U.S.  tobacco  inputs,  Pr.,  the composite  Table  3.  Exogenous  Variables
price of non-U.S.  tobacco  input P7 2, the price of
non-tobacco  inputs  Pk,R and  the maximum allow-  R  The maximum  allowable  MH  residue  level on  the
I,  .. ,  ,  ,  r,  ^  ^  - ^  i~i  J  tobacco blend of cigarettes
able  residue  level  R  for the  cigarette  blends  con-  tobacco blend of cigarettes
sumed  in Europe  The  demaJ  i  r  t  PT  The EU and U.S.  prices  of U.S.  tobacco  (fixed  price sumed in  Europe.  The demands,  DC, for  the two  '  c case)
types  of cigarettes  depend  on the own-price,  PC,  P  The EU and U.S.  prices  of non-U.S.  tobacco
K'  EU and U.S.  aggregates  of non-tobacco  inputs used  in
cigarette  production
The use  of  10  percent cost  share is the  result of discussions  with  PK  A price  index for the  aggregate non-tobacco inputs
industry  experts and the examination  of cost shares used by Sumner and
Alston and Beghin  and Chang.  *where  i  =  E,  U.Overton, Beghin,  and Foster  Regulations and Trade for Tobacco and Cigarettes  225
Table 4.  Parameters, their Definitions,  and Initial Values for  the Simulation
TlE/TlT  The  share of U.S.  tobacco going  to Europe as  unmanufactured  leaf  77%
Tlu/TlT  The  share of U.S.  tobacco going  to Europe in U.S.  cigarettes  23%
ICu  The EU elasticity  of demand  for the U.S.  produced cigarettes  -0.85
•cUE  The cross-price  elasticity of the  U.S.  cigarettes  0.20
4z
u The U.S.  elasticity  of demand  for the tobacco blend  -2.0
Uriu  The U.S.  elasticity  of demand  for U.S.  tobacco used in export cigarettes  - 1.0
Elg  The EU elasticity  of demand  for the EU produced  cigarettes  -0.60
T"EU  The cross-price  elasticity of the EU cigarettes  0.20
nZE  The EU  elasticity of demand  for the tobacco  blend  -2.0
TEi  The EU  elasticity of demand  for U.S.  tobacco  used in cigarettes  -3.0
1iTl  The weighted  average  of the elasticity  of demand  for U.S.  tobacco by  other users  -1.8
(oxu  The cost  share of U.S.  tobacco  in U.S.  cigarette  tobacco blends  0.70
Wu  The marginal  product of U.S.  tobacco in U.S.  cigarette  tobacco blends  0.75
c  The cost  share  of non-U.S.  tobacco  in U.S.  cigarette  tobacco blends  0.30
a
v u  The  mcost shar  oduct  of non-U.S.  tobacco  in  U.S.  cigarette  tobacco blends  0.25
OcE  The  cost share  of U.S.  tobacco  in EU  cigarette  tobacco blends  0.20
WEo  The  marginal  product of U.S.  tobacco  in EU  cigarette tobacco  blends  0.20
a2e  The cost share  of non-U.S.  tobacco in EU cigarette  tobacco blends  0.80
Wo2  The marginal  product of non-U.S.  tobacco in  EU cigarette  tobacco blends  0.80
O2-- 2 The difference  in the restricted  cost share and  the input contribution  0.05
cZt  The cost  share of the  tobacco blend in the  EU and U.S.  cigarettes  0.10
5BT1  The ratio of the U.S.  market  price for tobacco  to  the EU price  inclusive of tariffs  0.94
3
MM  The change  in marginal  cost  of MH residues  as MH residue  increases  1*10-10
3
rM  The change  in marginal  cost  of output  as MH  residue increases  -1*10-  1
Prr  The change in marginal  cost  of output  as output  increases  1.48*10
- 8
erUi  The elasticity of supply  of U.S.  tobacco  growers  at current  quota levels  10
*where  i =  E,  U.
Simulations of Tobacco  and Cigarette Trade  U.S.  cigarettes  is set at 0.20.2 The supply  elastic-
ity of U.S. tobacco  is thought to be relatively large
Initial parameters  to calibrate the model represent-  at current quota levels,  and following Babcock and
ing  current  conditions  derive  from  previously-  Foster,  it is  set at  10.  Finally,  an  estimate  of the
estimated demand-  and  production-related  elastic-  divergence  between the  marginal rate  of technical
ities,  calculated  cost shares,  and consensus  expert  substitution  and the  price ratios of the  tobacco in-
opinion. From this basis, we simulate the effects of  puts  of  the  tobacco  blend,  associated  with  the
a  10 percent  decrease in the allowable residue rate  forced  substitution away  from  the  inputs  contain-
limited  by  the EU  phytosanitary  MH  regulation.  ing residues,  is  set  at 0.05  and  increased  for the
We  also carry  out  sensitivity  analyses  by varying  simulations.  Table  4  lists  the  parameters,  a brief
price elasticities  and cost parameters  and  identify-  definition,  and their original values.
ing their influence on the effects  of decreasing the  Over the  period  1987  to  1991,  on  average  the
allowable  residue  rate.  These results  are  summa-  MH residue regulation of 80 ppm is nonbinding for
rized at the end of the  section.  EU  producers.  For example,  U.S.  flue-cured  and
For the simulations the cost share of the tobacco
blend  in  cigarettes  is taken  to  be  10  percent  for
both  EU  and  U.S.  manufacturers.l  The  derived  2 Brown  estimates  the  European  demand  for  U.S.  cigarettes  to  be
demand  elasticity  of the tobacco  blends  is  set  at  -0.84.  This estimate is  lower than other estimates  used in the literature
-2.0  also for both manufacturers,  and this param-  (e.g.  Sumner  and  Alston  and  Sumner and  Wohlgenant)  and  thus  the
estimate of -0.85  is increased in absolute  value during  the simulations.
eter  is  increased  in  the  sensitivity  analysis.  The  The demand  elasticity  of  the  EU  cigarette  is set  at  -0.5  which  is  a
demand  elasticity  for  U.S.  cigarettes  is  initially  mid-range  estimate  of  many  cigarette  demand  elasticities  reported  in
beat  - ,  an  fr  EU  c  etts  Brown.  Although,  Brown  finds the cross-price  elasticity between  U.S.
taken  to  be  at  -0.85,  and  for  EU  cigarettes  and EU cigarette  to be not  statistically different from zero,  it is initially
-0.60.  The cross-price  elasticity  of both EU  and  set here at the low  level of 0.2.226  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
burley made up only 26 percent of tobacco used by  Due to their  use  of a relatively  high proportion
German  manufacturers.  Given  an average  residue  of residue-free tobacco, in the fixed price scenario,
level  of 145  ppm, which errs  on the high side,  the  EU  manufacturers  are  affected  only  through  the
U.S.  share results in less than  38 ppm MH residue  cross-price  elasticity of EU  cigarette  demand.  As
for the whole  tobacco blend,  half of the  regulated  the  U.S.  cigarette  price  increases  due  to  compli-
limit.  Average use of U.S.  tobacco  over the  same  ance with a stricter MH regulation, the demand for
five years was  17 percent for Dutch manufacturers,  the  EU cigarette  increases  as well.  Given constant
6 percent  for Italian,  and  6 percent for British.  At  returs  to  scale,  EU  manufacturers  meet this  de-
these  usage  rates  an  EU-wide  adoption of  the  80  mand by increasing  output and inputs in equal pro-
ppm  regulation  with  not  affect  EU  demand  for  portions.  Per unit production costs and the EUcig-
U.S.  tobacco.  Even  at  an  exaggerated  rate  of  25  arette price remain  unchanged.  For U.S.  manufac-
percent of U.S.  tobacco in EU blends,  the average  turers,  however,  costs increase  as  input combina-
MH residues  would have  to be 320 ppm  to make  tions change to meet stricter residue requirements.
the limit binding,  50 percent higher than the high-  In  the fixed quota  scenario,  the price  of U.S.  to-
est residue crop average recorded.3 For U.S.  man-  bacco  falls  which  stimulates  the  EU  use  of U.S.
ufacturers,  tobacco  blends  contain  approximately  tobacco  and  decreases  the  price  of  EU  cigarettes
35  percent  U.S.  grown  flue-cured  and  30 percent  leading to an additional  feedback  effect on the  de-
U.S.  grown  burley.4 At the  1991  residue levels of  mand  for U.S.  cigarettes  and  a negative  substitu
145 ppm on flue-cured and 100 ppm on burley, the  tion effect  on EU  grown tobacco.
MH  residue  for  U.S.  manufactured  cigarettes  is  Table 5  presents the algebraic representations  of
approximately  81  ppm,  making  the  EU  standard  the percentage  changes of all the endogenous vari-
slightly  binding.5 ables  given some percentage  decrease,  ER,  in the
In order to simulate  the  effect of the MH regu-  regulated MH level.  Table  6 presents  the numer
lation on the trade flows of tobacco  and cigarettes,  ical  results of simulating  a  10 percent  decrease  in
further structure is  added to the general model out-  the  MH constraint for endogenous  variables.
lined  above.  Blended  tobacco  is  taken  to  be  an  We  first  discuss  the  results  for the  fixed price
intermediate  output  in the production  of cigarettes  scenario  (column  I of table  6).  The results  show
subject  to  a  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  that an  EU-wide  adoption  of more restrictive  MH
(CES)  production  process  using  residue-contami-  regulations  could  lower  the  demand for  U.S.  to-
nated  and  residue-free  inputs.  The  final  cigarette  bacco  significantly.  In  the  fixed  price  scenario,
output  is  also  a  CES  process  using  the  tobacco  U.S. tobacco production declines  to maintain U.S.
blend  input and  a composite  (non-tobacco)  input,  price.  However,  a  10 percent  decline  in the regu-
and  exhibiting  constant  returns  to  scale,  assuring  lated  level,  from  80 ppm to 72  ppm,  is  still non-
zero  profits."  binding  for EU cigarette  manufacturers.  The reg-
ulation, which only directly  affects U.S.  manufac-
turers,  results  in  increases  in  EU  cigarettes  sold.
In  1987,  the  year of  highest MH  residues  on U.S.  flue-cured,  the  U.S.  cigarette sales to Europe decline as prices rise
weighted  average  MH  residues  at moisture  levels  consistent with  ciga-  wit  i  i  c  a  w  m  i  to
rette  use were  231  ppm (Sheets  et al.).  With increases in  COStS  associated  With  moving  tO
*  The actual  amount of tobacco  types  used in  cigarette blends  is  not  blends that contain greater proportions of non-U. S.
often  revealed by  cigarette manufacturers.  Brown  states that  60 percent  tobaccos.  An indirect or second-round effect is that
of tobacco  in  U.S.  produced  cigarettes  is  domestic,  while Sumner  and
Alston use  a domestic tobacco content of 70 percent.  In recent years,  the  the  use  of U.S.  tobacco  by EU  manufacturers  in-
domestic share has been 66 percent in  1991  and 55 percent in  1993.  The  creases by  0.02 percent,  offsetting in part the de-
65  percent  domestic  use  given  here  is  in  line  with  other  estimates,  crease  in U.S.  tobacco use by U.S. manufacturers.
although  the  use of domestic  tobacco across  U.S.  manufacturers  may  Ti  i  i  i  t
vary.  This  increase is in the same percentage as the sales
' Tobacco  use  rates  cited  in  the  text  are  before  a  1993  domestic  of  EU  cigarettes,  owing  to  the  CRS  production
content requirement  of  75 percent  for U.S.  cigarettes  (Zaini).  This  re-  specification.  The  total  amount  of  U.S.  tobacco
quirement  has  been  ruled inconsistent  with  U.S.  GATT  commitments
and politically unpopular  with the incoming  104°' Congress. The content  going  to  Europe decreases by  1.6 percent.
requirement would increase  the probability of U.S.  manufacturers failing  For U.S.  cigarette manufacturers,  the lower res-
to meet the MH residue regulation when using U.S. tobacco and ignoring  idue limit leads to  a  7.1  percent  decline  in the use
their MH  residues.  Because  MH  residues  vary  across  areas  within  the
United States,  U.S.  manufacturers  might still meet the content require-
ment and  satisfy  the MH  residue  regulation,  although  costs would  in-
crease as manufacturers  must find  ways to identify  the  low residue  leaf
and keep  this separate  for  use  in export cigarettes  where the MH regu-  assuming  a fixed markup  i.e.,  a constant  elasticity of demand  for ciga-
lations  exist.  rettes,  that leads to  the same  relative change  in cigarette price  and mar-
' The  evidence  on  competition  in  the  cigarette  industry  is  mixed.  ginal cost  of cigarette production.
Sullivan and Sumner find evidence of price-taking behavior.  Appelbaum  7 The symbol E is used as the percentage  change operator here  and in
and  more  recently  Tremblay  and  Tremblay  find  evidence  of  market  the equations  given in Table 5.  Given the  variable X, the  notation EX =
power.  Market  power  can  easily  be  accommodated  in  our  model  by  d(lnX)  =  dX/X,  i.e.  the percentage  change  in X.Overton, Beghin, and Foster  Regulations and Trade for Tobacco and Cigarettes  227
Table  5.  Percentage Change Equations for the Endogenous  Variables
Quantity  of U.S.  cigarettes  sold:  /Eu  =  \
EQc  =  U(UR)  [ic  (X/Y)  -TUt  +  TO
+ TcEa z8(X/Y)]ER,  (fixed quota)
Price  of U.S.  cigarettes  in Europe:  /  \
EP~c =  —•_-)  [-a(t(a2u  - .2)](l  - C)ER,  (fixed price)
EP  =  ——R)  [aozU(X/Y)  - azu  + a' uo]ER,  (fixed quota)
Quantity of the U.S.  tobacco  blend:  /  y  \
EZU  = {  R)  [z(c2" - "2") - c("2 - s2u)](  - C)ER,  (fixed price)
E  = {  —R)  [P - w2]ER,  (fixed quota)
Value of the  U.S.  tobacco blend:  U  \
EP) [-(2
u - 2)](1  - C)ER,  (fixed price)
EP  = (——R)  [u(X/lY)  - a2  +  w2U)ER,  (fixed  quota)
U.S.  tobacco usage  by U.S.  /  .'\
manufacturers: *  ETlu =  —  )  (AU)(1  - C)ER,  (fixed  price)
ETIU  (  { ~~~  )(P)ER,  (fixed  quota)
Price  of U.S.  tobacco  in the  United  EPu  =  0,  (fixed  price)
States:  T
E141 =  (  'R  (XIY)ER,  (fixed quota)
Non-U.S.  tobacco usage  by  U.S.  /  \
manufacturers:  Mu2"  =  (y  R)  (-1  + Au)(l  - C)ER,  (fixed price)
ET2u =  (  —  (-1 + P)ER, (fixed  quota)
U.S.  quota lease rate:  E=-  r\T  - iMM  CE,  (.  pr.ce
EL =  - )  —QM  \(OER, (fixed  price)
EL  =  -/  (PTX  ER,  (fixed  quota)
U.S.  MH residue  level:  Ey  =  (C)ER,  (fixed price)
E~y  =  0, (fixed quota)
Quantity of EU  cigarettes  sold:  /  =  \
EQc =  y  -R)  A  ~ C)R (x  Prc)
EQE =  ((Y  ER)  E  X/Y) +  WEU  U U(X/y)  - TO  U
+ ^a U zO)]ER,  (fixed quota)
Price  of U.S.  cigarettes  in Europe:  EPE  =  0,  (fixed  price)
EP  c = (—  2)  [otEi 1 i(X/ly)]ER,  (fixed quota)228  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 5.  Percentage Change Equations for the  Endogenous  Variables  (continued)
Quantity of the EU tobacco  blend:  E  /E  (  (
EZ  =  A  (1 - C)ER,  (fixed price)
EZE  =  (  —-  [,  E[(XIY)]ER,  (fixed quota)
Value  of the EU tobacco  blend:  EPZ  =  0,  (fixed  price)
EP  =  (  R)  [c8l  (X/Y)]E,  (fixed quota)
U.S.  tobacco usage  by  EU
manufacturers:  ET1E =  R)  AE(I  - C)ER,  (fixed price)
ETE =  (~t  )  [tW(XyER  + EZE,  (fixed quota)
Price  of U.S.  tobacco  in Europe:  EpI =  0,  (fixed  price)
EPEi =  0  —  )  E(X/Y)]ER,  (fixed quota)
EPT  = (-  R)  [Ti(X/Y)]
E
Non-U.S.  tobacco usage  by  EU  E  y  \
manufacturers:  ET2  =  A(  - C)ER, (fixed  price)
ET2E  -=  (C/EEEZE  R  (WE  I,i  c
ET2e  = (1/woEZ)  - (,WEl)ET,  (fixed  quota)
Total use of U.S.  tobacco in  /  \
cigarettes  destined for Europe:  ETIT =  R  [(TlU/TIT)Au  + (TI/T)  AE]  - C)ER,  (fixed price)
ETIT = (TlU/TlT)ETl
u + (Ta)
Use  of U.S.  tobacco by  '/ 
manufacturers  producing  for  ETI
° =  y  —  )  [rl(X/Y)ER,  (fixed quota)
non-EU markets
ET1
0 = 0,  (fixed price)
*where
-,R  (T1Au + TlEAE)
~  ' + (—  ,)(TluAu  + TIEAE)
AU  =  ^U  - 1.^U(nu  - Wu) - .YUaU(au - U)
AE  =  U-  (U  - )
X  = (TlEITW U),EUr(r4 - U) - W  + ii  (rU - W  U) +  a(  - u)
Y  =  Wu  + (TlEITlU)WE + (TloITlu)n.oI
WE  =E  BE  +  EjEE  +_E  E  E+E  _+  EU  U  U
Wu  =  ^zl  +  t  zU~  +  c  °UEzEnElE
and
P =  -(TE/Tlu)WE(XIY)  - (TI1/TIu)•rt.0(X/Y)  + (T7lE/7TU)•nUcU(a  - UU).
of U.S.  tobacco  and a 12.9 percent  increase in the  At  the tobacco-growing  level,  the  influence  of
use  of non-U.S.  tobacco.  Lower  output of  U.S.  stricter regulations  on the residues of the U.S.  to-
cigarettes going to Europe results in higher product  bacco  input  is negative.  This  is  an indirect  effect
price,  which  in  turn  leads  to  an  increase  in  EU  resulting  from  changes  in  the  cartel  production
cigarette  production  and  the  use by  EU  manufac-  level.  An  8 ppm  (10%  of the  80  ppm  regulated
turers of all inputs, including U.S.  tobacco. Lower  level)  decrease in  allowable  residues  in EU  ciga-
U.S.  tobacco output indirectly  leads  to lower res-  rettes  leads  to a reduction  of 3.51  ppm (2.8%  of
idue rates due to changes in production practices (a  the  125 ppm actual level) in U.S.  tobacco residues.
shift in the marginal  cost of growing  tobacco).  The percentage  change  in  U.S.  quota  lease  ratesOverton, Beghin, and Foster  Regulations and Trade for Tobacco and Cigarettes  229
Table 6.  Results  of Simulating a 10 Percent Decrease  in the Regulated  MH  Level
Price fixed,  Price adjusts,
Variable  Quota adjusts  Quota fixed
regulated  residue  level,  R  -10  -10
U.S.  cig.  sold,  Q~c  -0.0849  -0.0134
U.S.  cig.  price, Pu  0.0999  0.1205
U.S.  tob. blend,  ZU  -2.0835  -2.5139
U.S.  tob. blend  price,  Pz
U 0.9993  1.2052
U.S.  tob. used  by U.S.,  TlU  -7.0799  -9.4583
price of U.S.  tob.  in U.S.,  Pr'l  0  -0.2624
non-U.S.  tob. used,  T2U  12.906  18.319
actual residue  level, ,y  -2.8052  0
quota lease  rate, L  0.00001  -1.1479
EU cig.  sold,  QE  0.0200  0.0271
EU cig.  price,  PE  0  -0.0049
EU  tob. blend,  ZE  0.0200  0.1257
EU  tob. blend  price,  P
E 0  -0.0493
U.S.  tob. used by  EU,  TIE  0.0200  0.8656
price  of U.S.  tob.  in EU,  PE  0  -0.2466
non-U.S.  tob.  used,  T2E  0.0200  -0.0593
U.S.  tob. destined to EU,  TI
r - 1.6129  - 1.5088
U.S.  tob. used by  others,  T1
° 0  0.4723
are positive  but  near  zero.  The high  elasticity  of  residue level  since  they  sell the  same  amount  of
tobacco supply at current quota levels implies little  tobacco.  Therefore  there  is  no  virtuous  feedback
change in marginal  costs as  quotas  are reduced  to  effect on the residue level as there was  in the  case
maintain a constant  price.  of adjustable  quota.  Finally, the negative effect on
Column 2 of Table  6 presents  the results of the  the  U.S.  quota  lease  rate  is  much  larger  in  this
fixed  quota  scenario.  With  the  fixed  quota  the  second scenario  because the price of U.S.  tobacco
price  of  U.S.  tobacco  adjusts  downward  because  falls and the marginal  cost of growing  tobacco re-
of the decrease in derived demand  in U.S.  cigarette  mains  the  same  (no  shift  due  to  falling  residue
manufacturing.  This price  decrease  stimulates  di-  levels).
rectly exports  of U.S.  tobacco  to the EU,  induces  These results are robust over a range of elasticity
a decrease  in EU cigarette prices,  and therefore  an  and  share  values  (Results  of  sensitivity  analyses
expansion of EU cigarette sales.  EU tobacco use is  are  available  upon request.) There  is little  change
influenced by  the  positive scale effect  and  a neg-  in the results if the  EU demand  for the  U.S.  ciga-
ative  substitution  effect due  to the  lower U.S.  to-  rette  is more  elastic,  i.e.,  as  Tqc increases  in abso-
bacco  price.  Overall  EU  tobacco  use  decreases  lute  value.  Not  surprisingly,  the  only  notable
slightly;  that is,  the  MH residue regulation has  an  changes  are in the quantity  of U.S.  cigarettes  sold.
anti-protective effect  on  EU  tobacco  producers.  Beyond the direct own-price effect,  changes  in de-
Other  cigarette  manufacturers  (for  non-EU  final  mand elasticity  might  have little influence  in  sim-
consumption)  expand  their  use  of  U.S.  tobacco  ulating trade flows of inputs and outputs as residue
which  is stimulated  by the lower U.S.  price.  This  regulations  are altered.  Note  also that,  beyond its
expansion did not arise in the adjustable quota sce-  influence  on manufacturers  constrained by a regu-
nario  due to  fixed price.  lation,  there  are  few  changes  associated  with the
In U.S.  cigarette  manufacturing,  the regulation  elasticity  of  the  derived  demand  for  the tobacco
induces  a  substitution  away  from  U.S.  tobacco  blend,  i.e.  'j u.
which  is  larger  in  the  fixed  quota  case  because  The regulation implies a divergence between the
tobacco  growers  have  no  incentives  to  adjust  the  cost share of the tobacco  input and its contribution230  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
to  the  production  process.  This  divergence,  or  fixed  quota  that  the  EU  residue  regulation  could
wedge (o2_u - u ), depends  negatively  on  the sub-  have a surprising antiprotective effect on EU grow-
stitutability of the inputs.  Low substitutability  im-  ers. Finally,  the quantity ofnon-U.S.  tobacco con-
plies a larger movement  away  from the  cost min-  sumed  by  U.S.  manufacturers  increases  substan-
imizing  input  bundle  and  a  higher  wedge  tially both under fixed  price  and  quota  scenarios.
(aC - uo2).  With  the higher  wedge,  the  use of the  In terms  of output  expansion,  foreign  suppliers  of
residue-contaminated  input  declines  further,  im-  tobacco in U.S.  cigarette manufacturing  appear  to
plying  greater  costs  and  larger  price  increases.  be the largest and unexpected gainers from the EU
This  results  in  more  EU  manufactured  cigarette  residue regulation.
sales  and  less  U.S.  cigarettes  sales  in  Europe.
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